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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft, a second degree felony, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he referred to matters that were 
properly admitted? 
A court reviews a claim of prosecutorial misconduct "in light of the totality of the 
evidence presented at trial," to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks called 
attention to matters the jurors "could not properly consider" and to determine whether 
"there is a reasonable likelihood that without the error the result would have been more 
favorable for the defendant." State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997); State v. 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court's "rulings on whether 
the prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion." Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with second degree felony theft. R. 1. The State moved 
for a pre-trial order admitting defendant's earlier convictions for stealing cars from car 
dealerships—one for not returning a car he had taken for a test drive and one for using a 
duplicate key made during a test drive to later take the test-driven car from the lot. 
R. 20-21. The trial court denied the motion. R. 147: [Tab 1], at 5. A jury convicted 
defendant as charged. R. 86. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term 
of one to fifteen years. R. 126. Defendant timely appealed. R. 128. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 17, 2002, defendant and two friends entered J.W. Auto Sales in 
Ogden. R. 146:52-53. Defendant told Thomas Salazar, a car salesman, that he wanted to 
purchase a sports utility vehicle. R. 146:54. Salazar allowed defendant to take a Blazer 
for a test drive. R. 146:57. When an hour or two later defendant had not returned the 
Blazer, Salazar, who had not asked for defendant's identification, called the police. 
R. 146:60. Salazar described defendant to the police. Id. 
A confidential informant later gave police a tip regarding defendant's possible 
involvement. R. 146:77. Based on that tip, Detective Jeff Pickrell prepared a photo 
spread. R. 146:77-79. When Pickrell showed Salazar the photo spread, Salazar 
identified defendant as the thief. R. 146:61-62, 83-84. 
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The vehicle was recovered about two weeks later. R. 146:84. Defendant was not 
driving the vehicle at that time. R. 146:84-85. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No misconduct occurred. The prosecutor did not call the jurors' attention to 
matters they could not properly consider. First, a witness explained that police had 
prepared a photo array that included defendant's photo because they had received a tip 
that defendant was possibly involved. The trial court ruled the testimony admissible for 
the limited purpose of explaining why the police prepared the photo array as they did. 
The prosecutor referred to the tip only for that purpose. 
Moreover, even if the prosecutor had referred to the tip for other purposes, his 
comments were permissible. Defendant opened the door to the prosecutor's rebuttal 
statements when he suggested, in his closing, that the police had manipulated the spread 
to elicit an identification of defendant. 
In any case, defendant has demonstrated no harm. The jury learned nothing new 
from the challenged reference to the tip. The prosecutor had referred to the tip, without 
objection, during his opening statement. Later, when testimony was given, the court had 
allowed evidence of the tip to come in, albeit for limited purposes only, again without 
objection. Finally, the prosecutor commented on the tip in his closing argument, once 
more without objection. Defendant objected only when the prosecutor mentioned the tip 
for the fourth time in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument. Thus, at the point 
where defendant objected, information about the tip had already been presented to the 
jury—both in contexts requiring use of the information for limited purposes only and in 
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contexts where no limitation was requested or imposed. Thus, the jury learned nothing 
new from the prosecutor's reference to the tip in his rebuttal to defendant's closing 
argument. Moreover, the jury had been instructed regarding the proper use of the tip 
evidence. Finally, in light the evidence in its totality, there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the prosecutor's reference to the tip in rebuttal, even if impermissible, affected the 
outcome. 
ARGUMENT 
NO MISCONDUCT OCCURRED—THE PROSECUTOR'S 
REBUTTAL REFERENCE TO THE TIP THAT CAUSED POLICE 
TO PREPARE THE PHOTO SPREAD DID NOT CALL THE 
JURORS' ATTENTION TO MATTERS THEY COULD NOT 
PROPERLY CONSIDER, DID NOT PLACE HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JURY, AND, IN ANY EVENT, WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he stated, in 
rebuttal to defendant's closing argument, that the detective who prepared the photo array 
"didn't just pull [defendant's] name out of the hat" and that "[t]here was some reason to 
put together a full lineup with [defendant's] picture in there." R. 146:127; Br. Appellant 
at 6, 12. 
To show prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the prosecutor's 
remarks "call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they could not properly 
consider in determining their verdict." Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. A defendant must 
also show that "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," any error was 
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that without the 
error the result would have been more favorable for the defendant." Fixel, 945 P.2d at 
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151; Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. A prosecutor is entitled to respond to a defendant's 
claims, and a prosecutor does not commit misconduct by addressing matters to which a 
defendant has "opened the door." Id. 
Here, no misconduct occurred. The trial court had earlier ruled that information 
about the tip was admissible to show why the detective included defendant's picture in 
the photo array. The prosecutor referred to the tip in closing argument rebuttal for that 
purpose. Moreover, defendant "opened the door" to the prosecutor's response when he 
argued that the photo spread was so suggestive that, but for the photo spread, the witness 
would not have identified defendant. Finally, in light of the totality of the evidence 
presented at trial, the prosecutor's statement was harmless. It was not reasonably likely 
the verdict would have been more favorable to defendant had the prosecutor not made the 
challenged statement. 
Background. Prior to opening statements at trial, the trial judge instructed the 
jury that some evidence would be admitted for a limited purpose. R. 146:44. She told 
the jurors that when she informed them that evidence was admissible only for a limited 
purpose, they must consider it for that limited purpose only. Id. The judge also 
instructed the jury that statements and arguments of the attorneys "are not evidence in the 
case." R. 146:44. 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained the theft. R. 146:48-49. 
He also explained that Ogden police officers received "a tip from a confidential 
informant that the defendant may be a suspect in this case" and that, based on the tip, 
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Detective Jeff Pickrell put together the photo spread. R. 146:49. Defendant did not 
object to this statement. 
During the State's presentation of its case, the prosecutor questioned Detective 
Pickrell about his investigation of the theft. R. 146:76-77. After Detective Pickrell stated 
that he began with a description of the thief, but with no leads, the prosecutor asked him 
to describe what happened next. R. 146:77. Detective Pickrell stated, "I got a lead. One 
of the gang detectives came to me, and a confidential informant had told him that—." Id. 
Defense counsel objected to any answer coming in for the truth of the matter 
asserted. Id, The prosecutor responded that he was offering the testimony only to show 
why Detective Pickrell put together the photo spread and "not for the truth of the matter." 
Id. 
The trial judge ruled that the testimony could come in as "preparatory comments," 
admitted solely "for the purpose of showing why [the detective] did what he did, as 
opposed to any kind of truth of the matter asserted." R. 146:77-78. She explained to the 
jury that she had earlier instructed them that some evidence was admissible for limited 
purposes only. Id. at 78. She told the jury that this was an example. Id. "It's just coming 
in solely as a preparatory statement to indicate why [the detective] did what he did." Id. 
The prosecutor then elicited testimony that Detective Pickrell got information 
through an officer from a confidential informant indicating that defendant might be a 
suspect. Id. On the basis of that information, the detective "composed a photo lineup." 
Id. Defense counsel raised no objection to this testimony. 
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Detective Pickrell also testified to the recovery of the stolen vehicle approximately 
two weeks later. R. 146:84. 
Defendant called no witnesses. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor summarized the State's case. 
R. 146:115-21. Referring to the photo spread, the prosecutor said, "Remember, Detective 
Pickrell did not just pick his name out of a hat. Okay. He did have some information 
that defendant was a suspect when he put that photo lineup together. Okay? He didn't do 
it because he had a bias or something against him; he did it because he had that 
information." R. 146:117. Defendant did not object to this argument. Id. 
Defense counsel then argued defendant's theory of the case. R. 146:121-26. He 
argued that Salazar may have misidentified defendant as the individual who took the 
stolen vehicle for a test drive. R. 146:121-23. Specifically, he argued that the photo 
spread was unduly suggestive, that defendant's photo was the only photo in the spread 
that matched Salazar's description of the thief, and that viewing defendant's photo in the 
photo spread, as contrasted with viewing defendant at the time of the test drive, may have 
resulted in Salazar's identification of defendant as the thief. Id J 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the photo spread was not suggestive and that 
all the subjects matched Salazar's description. R. 146:128. He reiterated that "the 
Defense counsel also argued that even if defendant was the individual who took 
the vehicle for a test drive, he may have returned it to the lot and someone else may have 
stolen it between the time it was returned and the time the salesman reported it missing. 
R. 146:125. 
7 
detective didn't just pull [defendant's] name out of the hat.. . . There was some reason to 
put together a full lineup with his picture in there." R. 146:127. 
Defendant objected to the statement, arguing that the "evidence was admitted for a 
limited purpose and not that the defendant committed the crime." Id. The prosecutor 
responded that he was only arguing the matter "to show the reason the detective did what 
he did." R. 146:128. "He had a reason to put together the photo lineup, and he did. He 
didn't just come up with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like [defendant]." Id. 
The trial court did not sustain the objection, but cautioned that the prosecutor should limit 
his argument to that. Id. Defendant made no further objection. Id. 
The court gave the jury written jury instructions to use during deliberations. 
R. 146:135-36. The written instructions reiterated the oral instructions given before 
opening statements. Instruction 7 cautioned: "Some evidence is admitted for a limited 
purpose only. When I instruct you that an item of evidence has been admitted for a 
limited purpose, you must consider it for that limited purpose and for no other." R. 51. 
Instruction 6 stated: "Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case, 
unless made as an admission or stipulation of fact." R. 50. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. R. 86. Defendant subsequently brought a 
motion to arrest judgment. R. 94-95. Among other things, defendant claimed that the 
prosecutor had improperly argued facts that the jury could not consider when he argued 
that defendant's photo had not been included in the photo spread by chance. Id. The trial 
court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. R. 147: Tab 3. The court found that the 
prosecutor's closing arguments were proper. R. 147: Tab 3, at 5. First, the prosecutor 
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referred to evidence of the tip for the same limited purpose for which the court had 
already admitted it and, second, he repeated to the jury the court's limitation on how the 
information could be used. Id. The court therefore found that the prosecutor committed 
no misconduct and, in any event, the challenged statements were not harmful. R. 121-22. 
A. The prosecutor's closing argument was not improper. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor called the jurors' attention to matters they 
were not permitted to consider when he argued that the detective had some reason to 
prepare the photo array. Br. Appellant at 12. The prosecutor's argument was not 
improper. The trial court had already ruled that the prosecutor could refer to the tip the 
detective had received to explain why he prepared a photo array that included defendant's 
picture. Moreover, defense counsel's closing argument "opened the door" to the 
prosecutor's argument. Defense counsel argued that all evidence of defendant's 
involvement could have stemmed from the allegedly suggestive character of the photo 
array and that defendant's photo array picture "might as well have just [had] a sign" on it 
saying "Pick me." R. 146:122-23. 
1. The prosecutor's statement referred to the evidence for a purpose the trial 
court had already ruled permissible. 
The trial court had already admitted evidence of the tip to explain why Detective 
Pickrell prepared a photo array that included defendant's picture. R. 146:78. Defendant 
has not challenged the trial court's ruling on that matter. 
Here, in his rebuttal to defendant's closing argument, the prosecutor again drew 
the jury's attention to the tip to explain why defendant's picture had been included in the 
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spread. Following defendant's closing argument attempts to undermine the propriety of 
the photo array, the prosecutor once more explained that the police officer prepared the 
photo array because he had received a tip and not because he randomly chose defendant's 
picture or because he selected defendant's picture for some improper reason. R. 146:121-
23; 127. Further, the prosecutor reiterated to the jury the judge's ruling that the jury 
could consider the information only for the purpose of explaining why the investigator 
prepared the photo spread. Id. Thus, the argument was proper, and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it ruled that the argument was proper. See R. 146:128 (trial 
court permitting prosecutor's reference to the tip for limited purpose); see also R. 122 
(trial court holding, in context of a post-trial challenge to the prosecutor's argument, that 
"[t]he prosecutor's mention of that information [the tip] and its limited purpose in closing 
argument was not misconduct and was harmless"). 
2. A prosecutor is entitled to address defense counsel's closing argument during 
rebuttal. 
Moreover, a prosecutor is entitled to respond, on rebuttal, to a defendant's points 
in closing argument. See State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990) 
(prosecutor's statement that defendant refused to participate in lineup was fair where 
prosecutor was responding to defendant's point in closing argument that a lineup was not 
conducted); see also State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973) (rebuttal "in direct 
reply to the theory advanced by defense counsel in his final argument" and "within the 
range of reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the evidence" is proper). 
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Where a defendant "open[s] the door," a response is "clearly not misconduct." See 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. 
Here, defense counsel suggested in closing argument that Salazar, the car 
salesman, identified defendant only because defendant's picture was included in the 
photo array. R. 146:122-23. Moreover, defense counsel argued that the detective had 
included no other photo that matched Salazar's description of the thief. R. 146:122. 
Thus, defense counsel suggested that the detective improperly manipulated the photo 
spread to implicate defendant. Defense counsel, in fact, claimed that defendant's photo 
"might as well have just [had] a sign" on it saying "Pick me." R. 146:122. Defense 
counsel further argued that Salazar identified defendant at the preliminary hearing 
because he had "seen the photo." R. 146:123. 
The prosecutor had both the right and the responsibility to respond "to the theory 
advanced by defense counsel in his final argument." Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. During 
rebuttal, he therefore explained why the photo array was fair and how all the photographs 
appeared to match Salazar's description of the thief. R. 146:127. He argued that the 
photo spread did not, by itself, suggest to Salazar that he should select defendant's photo. 
Id. He further noted that the detective who prepared the photo spread "didn't just pull 
[defendant's] name out of the hat" and that "[t]here was some reason to put together a foil 
lineup with his picture in there." Id. 
Defense counsel's closing argument "opened the door" to the prosecutor's 
argument. The prosecutor acted reasonably when he responded not only to an argument 
that the photo array was suggestive, but also to the implication that Detective Pickreil had 
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"somehow manipulated this photo lineup, and that's how the victim picked him out." 
R. 147: Tab 3, at 3. Where a defendant opens a door, a prosecutor's response is not 
misconduct. 
B. The prosecutor's closing remarks did not violate defendant's confrontation 
rights. 
1. This Court should not address this claim because defendant did not preserve 
it and he does not argue plain error on appeal. 
In conjunction with his claim that the prosecutor improperly called the jurors' 
attention to matters that they should not properly have considered, defendant claims that 
the prosecutor's rebuttal put hearsay testimony before the jury in violation of defendant's 
confrontation rights. Br. Appellant at 12-14. 
This claim is not properly before this Court. Defendant argued below that the 
prosecutor's reference to the tip in closing argument was improper and inconsistent with 
the limited purpose for which evidence of the tip was admitted. See R. 146:127 
(discussion during prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument at trial); see also R. 94-95 
(motion to arrest judgment); 147: Tab 3, 1-4 (hearing on motion to arrest judgment). He 
claimed no violation of his confrontation rights. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). "[I]n the 
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a 
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Moreover, "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
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fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." Id. (internal quotation and 
citation omitted) (brackets in original). To serve these policies, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that "the preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional 
questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
'plain error5 occurred." Id. 
Moreover, to preserve a claim, a defendant must raise in the district court the 
specific grounds for the objection stated on appeal. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
361 (Utah App. 1993). Utah precedent requires "specific objections in order to bring all 
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate." Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). The "specificity 
requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess allegations by isolating relevant 
facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue." 
Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). A general objection does not usually 
provide that context. "The 'mere mention' of an issue without introducing supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id. (citation 
omitted). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very 
error of which counsel complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) 
(objection to testimony on hearsay grounds does not preserve claims that testimony was 
inadmissible on other grounds). 
Defendant never claimed a violation of his confrontation rights below. He 
therefore did not preserve that claim. Moreover, he does not argue on appeal that any 
violation constituted plain error. This court should therefore decline to review his claim. 
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See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, \ 5, 63. P.3d 66 (declining to review constitutional 
claim raised for the first time on appeal where defendant asserted neither plain error or 
exceptional circumstances). 
2. In any case, the prosecutor's closing remarks did not violate defendant's 
confrontation rights. 
Defendant claims that jurors must have surmised that because the police officer 
received a tip, someone must have told him that defendant stole the car and that such an 
assertion is hearsay. Br. Appellant at 12. Defendant claims that the use of hearsay 
evidence violated his confrontation rights. Id. at 13. 
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant.. . , offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "However, if 
an out-of-court statement is offered to simply prove that it was made, without regard to 
whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." State in re G. Y., 
B.C., SM, andS.M., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 
332, 335 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation and additional citation omitted)). Testimony 
offered, not to prove that the statements are true, but to explain the reason for actions 
taken, is not hearsay. Id. (statements for purpose of showing caseworker's subsequent 
monitoring and reporting actions were not hearsay); see also United States v. Love, 767 
F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that "an out of court statement is not hearsay if it 
is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was 
undertaken"); United States v. Robles, 814 F. Supp. 1233, 1242 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding 
that witness statements regarding informant's tip "were not hearsay declarations because 
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they were not introduced for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statements, but rather, for the purpose of explaining the conduct of the Government 
agents"). 
Here, no statement was entered into evidence—hence there was no hearsay. 
Officer Pickrell merely testified that he included the photo because of an unspecified tip. 
R. 146:77. The prosecutor never referred to any statement. R. 146:127. 
Even if the testimony about the tip had included a statement, that testimony was 
not offered for proof of the truth of the tip. Moreover, the prosecutor did not argue, when 
referring to the tip, that the tip was truthful or that it was evidence that defendant 
committed the offense. Id. Rather, testimony about the tip was admitted during the 
State's case in chief to explain why the photo array was prepared and why defendant's 
photo was included. R. 146:77-78. The prosecutor referred to the tip in rebuttal only to 
explain why the photo array was prepared and to counter any suggestion that the 
detective manipulated the spread to implicate defendant. R. 146:128. 
In sum, evidence of the tip included no statement. The testimony was not 
admitted or cited in rebuttal to prove the truth of whatever content the tip may have had.2 
Hearsay testimony was not introduced or used, and defendant suffered no violation of his 
confrontation rights. 
In fact, at a later hearing on the matter, the trial court found that the prosecutor 
did not refer to the tip for any improper purpose. R. 147: Tab 3, at 5; 121-22. 
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C. In any event, in context, the prosecutor's remarks were not harmful. 
In any event, defendant has not demonstrated harm. This Court reviews a claim of 
prosecutorial conduct, not only to determine whether a prosecutor's remarks called 
attention to matters the jurors could not properly consider, but also to determine "in light 
of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," whether "there is a reasonable likelihood 
that without the error the result would have been more favorable for the defendant." 
Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151; Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925. "Further, because the trial court is in 
the best position to determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its 
rulings . . . will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Longshaw, 961 
P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998). For this reason, an appellate court will not overturn a 
trial court's rulings on whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial absent an abuse of 
discretion. See Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151. 
1. The jury learned nothing new in rebuttal. 
Here, the jury learned nothing new in the prosecutor's rebuttal to defendant's 
closing argument. Therefore, the prosecutor's closing statement reference to the tip 
detectives received was harmless. 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained, without objection, that the 
police "got a tip from a confidential informant that the defendant may be a suspect in this 
case. So with that tip, Detective Pickrell put together a photo lineup." R. 146:49. 
Defendant did not object to this statement. Defendant did not object to the prosecution's 
reference to the tip, and he did not request any kind of curative instruction. Thus, he 
waived any claim of harm based on the jurors' exposure to this information. See 
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Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925 (failure to object or ask for a curative instruction waived 
claim based on prosecutor's references to inadmissible bad acts). The prosecutor's 
reference to the tip in rebuttal, now challenged on review, added nothing to this 
statement. If prejudicial, it was no more prejudicial than the opening statement remark, 
which defendant does not challenge on appeal. Defendant has therefore waived any 
claim as to prejudice caused by the earlier statement, and does not demonstrate that the 
rebuttal statement was in any way more prejudicial than the opening statement remark. 
Later, during the State's case in chief, a prosecution witness, explaining the course 
of his investigation, stated, "I got a lead. One of the gang detectives came to me, and a 
confidential informant had told him that—." R. 146:77. Defendant objected to the 
informant's statement coming in for the truth of the matter asserted, but did not object 
when the trial court ruled that testimony that the officer received a tip could come in to 
explain why the witness prepared the photo array and told the jurors that they could 
consider the testimony for that limited purpose only. R. 146:77-78. 
Further, the prosecutor referred to the tip again during his closing argument. 
"Detective Pickrell just didn't pick his name out of a hat. Okay. He did have some 
information . . . when he put that photo lineup together." R. 146:117. "He didn't do it 
because he had a bias or something against him; he did it because he had that 
information." Id. Again, defendant did not object. Defendant objected only when, in 
rebuttal, the prosecution again stated that "[tjhere was some reason to put together a full 
lineup." R. 146:127. 
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Defendant's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement and other 
references to the tip waived any claim of error based on those actions. Thus, defendant 
can show prejudice based on the prosecutor's reference to the tip during rebuttal only if 
he can demonstrate how the rebuttal statement was more harmful than the earlier 
references to the same information. Defendant has not done that. 
2. The trial judge gave oral and written instructions limiting the use of 
testimony about the tip. The prosecutor himself reiterated, in connection 
with his reference to the testimony in rebuttal, the limited permissible use of 
the evidence. 
Further, the trial judge explained that evidence that a tip had been received should 
be considered only to explain why police prepared a photo array that included 
defendant's photo and not for the truth of tip itself. See R. 146:44, 78, 128; 51. 
Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself reminded the jury that the judge had limited the 
purposes for which they could consider the testimony. R. 146:128. In addition, the trial 
court instructed the jury that statements and arguments of lawyers were not evidence in 
the case. R. 50; 146:44. A court may "normally presume that a jury will follow an 
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is 
an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' 
to the defendant." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (citing Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987)). Nothing in this case suggests that the jury was 
unable to follow the instructions below to limit use of testimony about the tip to the 
purposes permitted by the trial court. 
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3. In light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the prosecutor's reference to the tip, even if improper, affected 
the outcome. 
Finally, "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," there is no 
reasonable likelihood that any improper reference to the tip affected the outcome. The 
evidence against defendant was strong. Salazar, the car salesman, identified defendant 
without difficulty. R. 146:61. Salazar stated that he had no doubt that defendant was the 
individual who took the car for a test drive. R. 146:63. 
Salazar was plagued by none of the factors that sometimes limit the ability of 
victims to identify perpetrators. Salazar interacted with defendant in what appeared to be 
a normal business transaction and was not caught up in the hurry, emotion, and fear 
usually attendant to a robbery or assault. R. 146:54. Salazar spoke with defendant, who 
represented himself as a potential purchaser, in full daylight on the car dealership lot for 
about five minutes. R. 146:53-58. He observed that defendant was "six-one, 200 pounds 
or so," his "hair [was] cut a little shorter on the bottom," and "he had a goatee." 
R. 146:53. When Salazar first introduced himself to defendant, he noted defendant's 
distinctive "little grin, a little smirk." R. 146:53, 62. 
When shown the photo array, Salazar positively identified defendant. R. 146:61. 
During the preliminary hearing, he again identified defendant, noting both his appearance 
and the mannerism he characterized as "a little smirk." R. 146:62. 
Defendant was unable to undermine Salazar's identification in cross-examination. 
See R. 146:63-69. Defendant presented no witnesses or evidence to suggest that Salazar 
was wrong. 
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"[I]n light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," there exists no 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecutor's rebuttal reference to the tip, "the result 
would have been more favorable for the defendant." Pixel, 945 P.2d at 151; Humphrey, 
793P.2dat925. 
Moreover, the trial court found that the prosecutor's comments were harmless. 
R. 121-22. The trial court was in the best position to determine the impact of the 
prosecutor's statements upon the proceedings and properly exercised its discretion when 
it ruled that any reference to the tip was harmless. See Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 927. This 
Court should therefore reject defendant's claim of prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 2$ day of /\Aq^cjL , 2004. 
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